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The Corfu Channel Case arose early In the life o r the United
Nations Organization. As a dispute it falls into one of the two
main categories that have been noted as dominating international re-
lations since World War II, the category which includes the disputes
between Communist and non-Communist states as differentiated from
the disputes arising from the changing status of former colonies.
It arose from incidents which occurred in 1946, the year in which
the Security Council met first, and is an incident in the beginning
of the "cold war," although, at the time, the relations between the
United States, Great Britain, and the USSR had already deteriorated
as a result of the deadlocked foreign Ministers' Conference of 1945
in London and the failure of the Soviet Union to carry out the
Yalta Agreements regarding the liberated countries of Eastern Europe.
The Security Council met first in January 1946. It agreed to
postpone substantive questions until the second part o*" the session
in September, 1946. The first substantive matter to be brought up
was the complaint of the Iranian government regarding Soviet influ-
ence. Next the Soviet Union and the Ukraine asked the Council to
consider the subject of British troops in Greece and Indonesia.
These moves made it impossible for the Council to consider its pro-
cedures calmly before being seised with political divisions.




settlement did not have direct international consequence* of gravity,
Its value for future study will stem almost entirely from its con-
tributions to international law. The Security Council debates
on the Greek situation and disarmament which were carried on concur-
rently, overshadowed it in the general attention of the public.
The case was and is unique in many respects. It is the only
case in which the Security Council has recommended that the parties
refer their dispute to the International Court of Justice. It is
the only case in which the International Court has considered a
question involving security interests of the parties. It is the
only case in which the International Court has considered a ques-
tion involving a member of the Communist bloc. Lastly, it is the
only case in which a party has refused to carry out a judgment of
the Court.
Historically, the case is a typical instance in which a dif-
ference between two nations becomes a matter of international con-
cern when it Impinges on the freedom of the seas. This situation
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1. The Corfu Channel Incident
a
The Greek island of Corfu, lying in the Ionian Sea at the
Greek-Albanian border, forms a narrow hut navigable strait which
has its southern opening in the Ionian Sea and leads toward the
Adriatic by way of the Strait of Otranto. The use of this strait
by mariners was such as to warrant its being swept for mines, and
this was done in 1944 by an organization established by the Allied
High Command. A sweeping operation was conducted in October,
1944, and in November, 1944 the Allied High Command announced that
the channel was safe for navigation. After the German surrender,
the work of clearing mines from European waters was continued by
an organization constituted by an international agreement signed
by authorized representatives of the United States, United King-
dom, France and the Soviet Union. This organization, the Inter-
national Central Mine Clearance Board, included the Corfu Channel
in the routes regularly listed and reported on in the series of
advisories to mariners known as the Mediterranean Routing Instruc-
tions, and had the channel swept in 1945 as a precautionary measure,
1. United Nations, Security Council, Second Year, Official Records
,
Supplement No. 6, Exhibit III.

2On the fifteenth of May, 1946, two British cruisers, HMS
Orion and HMS Superb were fired upon, while passing south through
the channel, by shore batteries on the Albanian coast. The fall
of shot was abeam and astern in a pattern which made it clear that
the ships themselves had been the targets and that these were not
warning shots.
On the twenty-second of October, 1946, the cruisers Leander
and Mauritius , escorted by the destroyers Saumareg and Volage . got
underway from the island port of Corfu and proceeded up the chan-
nel to the north. At 1453, HMS Saumareg was damaged by an under-
water explosion presumed to be a mine. The explosion occurred in
the swept channel off the Albanian port of Saranda. The damage
was severe and HMS Volage attempted to take the damaged ship in tow.
In the maneuvers preparatory to doing this, Volage in turn was
badly damaged by an underwater explosion. It is the latter two
occurrences which formed the basis for the United Kingdom side in
the Corfu Channel Case.
Volage managed by good seamanship to tow Saumareg to Corfu
where both ships were beached. Saumareg became a total loss and
Volage suffered major damage. Forty-four British seamen lost
their lives and forty-two were injured.
On the twelfth and thirteenth of November, 1946, British
naval forces conducted a minesweeping operation in the waters in
which the explosions had occurred. A commander of the Trench Navy,
Capitaine de Fregate-Mestre, accompanied the operation as a foreign
-
observer and provided a written report on the conduct o*" the opera-
2
tion. The British minesweeping forces discovpred in the loca-
tion where the explosions had occurred, a neld o* twenty-two newly
laid moored contact mines. The mines were swept and two were
towed to Corfu for examination from whence they were subsequently
transported to Malta for more detailed analysis.
2. The Diplomatic Exchange s
The naval incidents which have been related were paralleled
by certain diplomatic actions. The first correspondence which
should be noted here is the distribution of Medri charts and pamphlets
of the International Routing and Reporting; Authority operating in
conjunction with the Central Mine Clearance Board. The areas of
Albanian territorial waters swept by authority of the Central Mine
Clearance Board were included in these publications, and the Corfu
Channel itself was included in the routes numbered 18/32 and 18/34
on the charts. The Albanian government , like the governments of
other Mediterranean countries, received thirty copies of these and
subsequent mine clearance information, and was thus, as the United
Kingdom stated in its note of 9 December 1S46 addressed to Albania,
"publicly notified that the international waterway of the north
Corfu Channel was once again open to navigation and it and other
swept channels, wholly or partly in Albanian territorial waters,
2. United Nations, Security Council, Supplement No. 6, Exhibit V.

were used by British and other ship* in possession of these docu-
3
mentSo"
The shelling of British cruisers on the fifteenth of May had
brought a British note of protest to Albania. This note requested
an immediate and public apology and an assurance that persons respon-
sible would be punished. The Albanian reply to this note, dated
21 May, alleged that the commander of the coastal batteries had sig-
nalled the ships to more farther off shore, that they were not fly-
ing their flags, and that they hoisted their flags when fire was
opened. This reply of Albania assumed that foreign warships did
not enjoy the right of innocent passage in an international strait
part of which is included in territorial waters, and added that the
ships would not have been fired upon had they been recognized as
British ships. The United Kingdom renewed its protest in a note
on 31 May 1946, pointing out that the Albanian reply ignored rights
established by international law, and that even if the Albanian
government supposed that it had the right to prevent the passage,
the procedure adopted for asserting it, the aiming of twelve live
rounds at the vessels, was contrary to the practice of all civilized
nations. The Albanian reply to this note, dated 21 June, said that
there was no intention of interfering with navigation on the open
sea or in the Corfu Channel provided shipping did not enter Albanian






































in the concluding note to this series, the United Kingdom
advised
Albania that it had taken note of its reply, that it could recognise
no right of a Power to set conditions for entry into a recognized
International channel, that it did not agree to give prior notice of
passage, and that if British ships in the channel were fired on in
the future, fire would be returned*
Thus a position had been clearly taken on the matter by the
United Kingdom but from the correspondence, the position of Albania
was not so clear. One note had stated that the ships would not
have been fired upon had they been recognized as British,, The
other stated that navigation in the Corfu Channel would not be in-
terfered with provided it did not enter Albanian waters. This
posed an impossible problem since the northern portion of the
cleared channel was almost entirely within Albanian territorial waters.
The passage of the channel on 22 October, during which the
Saumarez and Volage were mined was, as brought out in subsequent tes-
timony of British officers, a test of Albanian intentions and an
assertion of British rights. The crews were at "general quarters"
for the safety of the ships*
Following the incidents of 22 October, which form the basis of
the case, the United Kingdom addressed a note to the Albanian Govern-
ment on 26 October. This note stated that in view of the serious
incidents which occurred recently to two of His Majesty 1 a warships
passing through the Corfu Channel, and of which the Albanian authori-






















shortly sweep the channel. A similar communication
was made to the
Greek government.
Albania replied on 31 October, 1946, Her note protested
the
violation of Albanian territorial waters by British warships.
It
stated that Albania had no objection to the projected minesweeping
operation but that the ships engaged should not enter Albanian ter-
ritorial waters. A British note referring to the previous notes of
26 and 31 October, informed the Albanian government that sweeping of
the Corfu Channel would take place on 12 November. It was stated
that this was being done in accordance with a unanimous decision of
the Control Mine Clearance Board on 1 November that the channel
4
should be reswept. It described the area to be swept as Medri
areas 18/32 and 18/34 as defined by charts in the possession of the
Albanian government. It added that no ships would be stationed In
Albanian waters and that the operation would be carried out in
exactly the same way as the original sweeping done in October 1944
and February 1945, to which the Albanian government had raised no
objection. On 11 November, Albania replied to this note, protest-
ing the unilateral decision of the United Kingdom and challenging
the propriety of facing a sovereign country with such a fait accompli
The note then proposed the establishment of a mixed commission to
decide what area of the sea should constitute the channel of naviga-











tion to be swept. The Albanian note thus restated the Albanian posi-
tion and requested that any sweeping inside Albanian territorial waters
"where foreign warships hare no reason to sail," would be considered a
Tiolation of Albanian territory and sovereignty, and that the damage
to the two British warships had occurred in such waters.
On 9 December, 1946, after evaluating the results of the
sweeping operation on the 12th and 13th of November, the United King-
dom addressed a long note to Albania. This note reviewed the history
of the mine problem and the incidents leading up to the minesweeplng
operation, including the shelling of HMS Orion and Superb and the
mining of HMS Yolaee and Saumares . The note stated the United King-
dom 1 o conclusion that the Albanian government either had laid the
minefield or knew that it had been laid. It demanded an apology
for the acts of 15 May and 22 October, assurance of no repetition,
reparations to the United Kingdom for the damages and compensation
to the relatives of the men who had lost their lives. The last par-
agraph stated that if no satisfactory reply were received within four-
teen days, the United Kingdom would have no alternative but to bring
the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations as a
serious threat to, and breach of, international peace and security.
The Albanian reply to this note rejected the accusations, while express-
ing regret for the accident.
Albania had meanwhile addressed a series of four notes to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 29 October, 12, 13,
and 27 November, 1946. Each of these notes protested the actions of









































































8were circulated to members of the General Assembly and the second
two to the Department of Security Council Affairs. A letter ^rom
the representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council,
dated 10 January, 1947, and addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, brought the dispute to the attention o*" the
Security Council under Article 35 of the United Nations Charter.
This letter and its enclosures became Security Council Document
3/247 and opened the case in the Security Council, appearing on the
Provisional Agenda at the Ninety-fourth Meeting held at Lake Success,
New York, on Friday, 17 January, 1947.
3. The Role of the Security Oouncil
The first problem which the Security Council faced was that
of the adoption of the agenda listing the case. The Societ Union
delegate,Andrti Gromyko, immediately objected on the grounds, first,
that all peaceful means for settling the dispute outside the United
Nations had not been exhausted and, second, that the dispute did not
threaten peace and security. The matter was brought to a vote on
20 January, 1947, and the agenda was adopted by ten votes with the
Soviet Union abstaining. In accordance with Article 32 of the U.N.
Charter, Albania was invited to take part in the discussion of that
item of the agenda under the condition that she accept the obliga-
tions which would apply to a member of the United Nations. By 28
January a reply had been received from Albania accepting the invita-
tion and the conditions imposed. On 10 February, 1947, Mr. Hysni
Kapo, the Albanian representative, took a seat at the Council table
.
and the substantive discussion of the Corfu Channel Caae began.
The first aspect of the case, as in most other disputes,
was that of the question of the competence of the Security Coun-
cil to deal with the matter. This was effectively decided by the
appointment on 27 February, 1947, of a Security Council sub-commit-
5
tee to examine the evidence and report to the Council. The sub-
6
committee returned a report to the Security Council on 20 March,
7
1947. The Security Council continued its debate until a United
Kingdom resolution which would have recommended that the two par-
ties settle the dispute on the basis of Albania* s knowledge of the
existence of the minefield, was brought to a vote. This resolu-
tion was vetoed by the Soviet Union on 25 March, 1947. Poland
8
also voted against it and Syria abstained. The debate continued
until a second United Kingdom resolution to the effect that both
parties should immediately refer the dispute to the International
Court of Justice was passed, with Poland and the IT.S.S.R. abstain-
9
ing. This recommendation ended the Security Council's part in
5. U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records. No. 21,
114th Meeting (27 February, 1947), pp. 432-438.
6. U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records . Supplement
No. 10, Annex 22. Document 5/300.
7. Ibid., No. 27, 120th Meeting (20 March, 1947), p. 544.
8. ibid., No. 29, 122nd Meeting (25 March, 1947), p. 609.





4. The Role of the International Coart
The proceedings before the International Court of Justice were
11
instituted by a written application addressed to the Registrar of
the Court by If, 1. Beckett acting as agent for the United Kingdom.
This application, dated 13 May, 1947, was delivered at The Hague on
22 May, 1947. Its receipt was made known by the Registrar to the
Government of Albania and the Secretary-General o*" the United Nations.
12
A letter dated 2 July, 1947, addressed to the Registrar of the Court
by the Albanian deputy-minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr, Hysni Kapo,
confirmed the receipt by Albania o^ the United Kingdom Application,
asserted that "the Albanian Government would be within its rights"
in holding that a special agreement was a necessary preliminary, but
went on to say that Albania accepted the decision of the Security
Council, was prepared to appear before the court, and that "its ac-
ceptance of the Court' s jurisdiction for this case cannot constitute
a precedent for the future." The letter then named as agent for
Albania, Mr. Hahreman Ylli. This communication became the basis for
10. The Security Council cannot be said to be entirely ^ree of the
matter since the United Kingdom is assured recourse to it as a remedy
for Albania's subsequent failure to comply with the judgment o^ the
International Court of Justice.
11. International Court of Justice, The Corfu Channel Cpre. Plead-
ings. Oral Arguments. Documents . Vol. I, p. 8.






the assertion of jurisdiction "by the Court when it was subsequently
disputed.
13
The President of the Court, in an order dated July 31st, 1947,
fixed the dates for the submission of memorial, counter-memorial, re-
joinder, and reply. This sequence was interrupted when on 9 December,
14
1947, Albania filed a Preliminary Objection to the jurisdiction of
the Court. The Court proceeded to receive British observations
and submissions on the Albanian Preliminary Objection and on 25 March,
15
1948, handed down its first judgment. This judgment rejected the
Albanian preliminary objection and fixed time limits for the sub-
mission of subsequent pleadings.
Upon this assertion of jurisdiction by the Court, both parties
16
filed a Special Agreement which outlined two specific issues in the
case and asked the Court to rule. The Court accepted this Special
Agreement as the basis for its further proceedings and handed down a
17
second judgment on the merits of the case on April 9, 1949. This
13. International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments. Advisory
Opinions, and Orders 1947-1948
. p. 4.
14. International Court of Justice, Pleadings. Oral Arguments. Docu-
ments . Vol. II, p. 8.
15. International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments. Advisory
Opinions, and Orders. 1947-1948
. pp. 15-48.
16. International Court of Justice, Pleadings. Oral Arguments. Docu-
ments. The Corfu Channel Case . Vol. II, p. 29.
17. International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments. Advisory











judgment found Albania responsible for the damage to British ships
and the accompanying loss of life and therefore liable for compensa-
tion. The Court based this finding on its determination of the
fact that Albania must have had knowledge of the presence of the
mine field. In the second part of this judgment the Court found
that Albanian sovereignty had not been violated on 22 October 1946,
but that British minesweeping operation on 12 and 13 November,
1946 had constituted such a violation. This finding in itself was
adjudged adequate compensation to the Albanian government. The
Court asserted its jurisdiction to further assess the amount of
18
compensation due the United Kingdom and reserved this decision
until receipt of an Albanian statement as to which of the United
Kingdom claims it disputed. In its third judgment in the Corfu
Channel Case, the Court on 15 December, 1949 fixed the amount of
compensation due from the Peoples Bepublic of Albania at L843.947.
The Albanian government was absent and made no submissions except
19
for a request for a prolongation of time limits received by the
Court on the day those limits expired. The compensation has never
been paid.
18. Ibid ., p. 26.




CONSIDERATION BY TEE SECURITY COUNCIL
1. The Agenda Question
As has been noted, a total of five pertinent communications
were received in the United Nations prior to discussion o*" the Cor^u
Channel Case by the Security Council. Tour of these communications
were from Albania and one from the United Kingdom. The United King-
dom note was placed on the provisional agenda of the Security Council
but none of the Albanian notes were. Was this an equitable proced-
ure and in keeping with the spirit and letter of the United Nations
Charter?
The first of these communications was a telegram, dated 29
October, 1946, from the President of the Council of Ministers of the
20
Peoples Republic of Albania addressed to the Secretary-General.
This telegram was a protest against an alleged version of the inci-
dents of 22 October, and the telegram was described as a submission
through the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United
Nations of the facts alleged and a protest against them. The United
Nations was requested to intervene "in order to put a stop to such
provocations." This communication was circulated to members o^ the
20. U.N. Security Counoil, Second Year, Official Records . Supplement
No.2,Annex 9, p. 46 (Document 5/250).

14
General Assembly on 1 November, 1946. It waf not brought to the at-
tention of the Security Council except as evidence subsequent to plac-
ing the dispute on the agenda of that body at the instance of the
United Kingdom. Since any member of the Security Council or of the
General Assembly has the power to have an item placed on a provisional
agenda of either body, as the procedural rules of these bodies provide,
and this was not done, the conclusion may be drawn that the members
of the United Nations did not at the time wish the dispute to be dealt
with by either organ.
Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter provides that a state
which is not a member may bring to the attention of the Security Coun-
cil or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if
it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligation
of pacific settlement as provided in the Charter. The Albanian tele-
gram did not refer to this article, it specifically addressed its alle-
gations to the members of the General Assembly, and it contained no
acceptance of the obligation of pacific settlement. It was, neverthe-
less, circulated to the members of the General Assembly who were at
perfect freedom to have the matter placed on a provisional agenda, but
did not do so
.
21
The second Albanian telegram was dated 12 November, 1946.
It consisted of a protest against the decision o*" the United Kingdom
to sweep the Corfu Channel for mines, and an unrelated protest against
the demand of the American mission to Albania to bring two warships
21. Ibid., p. 48,

15
into Durazzo for the purpose of evacuating personnel. No action was
requested or suggested in this communication, which was, like the pre-
ceding one, distributed to the members of the General Assembly and
susceptible to the same procedures.
The third of these telegrams, dated 13 March, 1946, referred
22
to the previous one. It gave an Albanian version of ths mine-
sweeping on 12 November, and requested that the United Nations "judge"
the act and give orders for the withdrawal of British forces from
Albanian waters. This telegram, according to the note preceding
these documents as they are reproduced in the Official Becords . was
referred to the Department of Security Council Affairs. This office
is an administrative division of the Secretariat which has, as one of
its functions, assisting the Secretary-General in his responsibilities
under Article 99 of the Charter.
A fourth telegram disputed the facts alleged by the United
Kingdom and requested the Secretary-General to draw other "facts" to
23
the attention of the Assembly of the United Nations. This telegram
was al6o referred by the Secretary-General to the Department of Secur-
ity Council Affairs. The handling o*" the two last-named documents
was the complete responsibility of the Secretary-General. Presumably
the administrative occasion was taken within the Secretariat not to
place the matter on a provisional agenda. As a ^inal disposition,
this is not within the power of the Secretary-General, In accordance
22. Ibid., p. 49.
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16
with Article 35(2) of the Charter, it would zeem mandatory that the
fourth telegram he placed on the provisional agenda o^ the General
Assembly, subject to prior acceptance by Albania of the obligations
for peaceful settlement provided for in the Charter. The effect of
this apparent irregularity in procedure was nullified, of course,
when the dispute came before the Security Council at the instance of
the United Kingdom, the same remedy being available to Albania under
these circumstances as if she had managed h^rs^lf to have the matter
introduced. There is a difference in the opportunity afforded to
air the case to public opinion, as between the Assembly and the Secur-
ity Council, but the remedy available to a party is greater if the
dispute is beir.g dealt with by the Security Council. It is neverthe-
less worth noting that a non-member state in exercising its privilege
under Article 35, paragraph 2, »f the Charter would do well to make its
communication state explicitly its Charter authority and the organ to
which referral is sought. The risk of an administrative disposal of
the request within the Secretariat might thus be reduced.
In evaluating the above actions it must be considered that the
United Kingdom had been in direct communication with Albania on the
matters which were the subject o^ the Albanian telegrams, and one of
the principles of 8.1, action as set forth in Article 33, is the prior
attempt by parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means. There
is no question but what placing such a dispute on the agenda of the
United Nations while outside negotiations were in progress would hazard
these negotiations. The Secretary-General might well make such con-
sideration the basis for the timing of the introduction of disputes to

17
the provisional agenda, if not for the final disposition of application,
When all such administrative problems are settled and an item
is placed on the provisional agenda, its first deliberative obstacle
is the debate on the adoption o-f the agenda. This is a procedural
matter and it may be ventured that were it not, a Soviet veto would
have blocked Security Council consideration before the substance of
the Cor-fu Channel dispute was ever taken up. The vigorous arguments
of Mr. Gromyko against the adoption of this agenda are inconsistent
with the previous efforts o* Albania to bring the matter before the
United Nations. He stated that the case should not be an appropriate
matter fcr Security Council consideration because the possibilities
for peaceful settlement had not been exhausted, citing the proposed
mixed commission, and further that the dispute did not constitute a
24
threat to peace and security. It is inconceivable that in view
of overwhelming opinion assuring adoption o*" the agenda, the Soviet
delegate took advantage of an opportunity to verbally attack the
United Kingdom for purely propagandists reasons. He abstained from
the vote and all other members, including Poland, voted in favor of










United States of America 25
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
24. U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Q-r-ficial Records . No. 6,
Ninety-fifth Meeting (20 January, 1947), p. 115.
25. HttA-f p« 117 .

18
Ab a general thing, the argument that the Security Council
should not interfere at long as the parties may be able to reach a
reasonable settlement has served as well to justify a refusal to take
up questions with which members do not wish to deal for any political
reason.
The invitation which was issued to Albania was only mandatory
under Article 32 if the Security Council considered the question a
"dispute 11 within the meaning of the Charter. There was no such
specific determination by the Council but it was implied by the invi-
tation and the question was handled as a "dispute" by tacit consent
thereafter. The imposition of conditions upon Albania, as provided
for by Article 32, tends to confirm the opinion that the Security
Council was acting under Article 32 rather than Article 31. There is
an obligation to issue an invitation in the case o** a dispute under
Article 32, but the Security Council has the option of inviting a
non-member to participate in the discussion o^ any "question" under
Article 31.
2. The Competence of the Security Council
Further discussion o^ the dispute by the Security Council was
delayed pending the arrival of Mr. Hysni Kapo to represent Albania.
There was some discussion in the Security Council regarding the sched-
uling of the next discussions. It was suggested by the Chinese dele-
gate that a definite date should be named on which the Council would




tative. It was finally decided to treat this as an administrative
detail and authorise the President of the Security Council to communi-
cate with the Albanian government regarding the probable date of arri-
val of its representative, and to allow him to set the date for the
next meeting as he saw fit and with regard to his information from
the Albanians. The dispute itself was thus first discussed on 18
27
February, 1947, when Mr. Kapo took his seat at the Council table.
As has become almost customary, the dispute was introduced by speeches
from the parties. The United Kingdom's case was introduced first by
Sir Alexander Cadogan at the 107th meeting,- a meeting which was de-
voted entirely to this presentation. Documentary evidence had been
circulated to members of the United Kingdom and other evidence was
deposited with the Secretary-General. Sir Alexander, after reviewing
the incidents and the diplomatic exchanges, reported the British con-
clusions as drawn from their examination of the recovered mines. The
most significant of these was that the minefield had been laid in the
swept channel no more than six months prior to the explosions on 22
28
October. This conclusion was based on the lack o^ rust and marine
growth found on the mines. The resulting responsibility of Albania
was argued under fiule Number 8 of the 1907 Hague Convention and exist-
ing international law. Sir Alexander asked that the Council
26. U.H. Security Council, Second Tear, Official Becords . No. 8, 97th
Meeting (31 January, 1947), p. 139.
27. Ibid .. No. 15, 107th Meeting (18 February, 1947), p. 293.
28. Ibid., p. 297.
i-
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recommend settlement of the dispute by direct negotiation under Article
36 of the Charter, after making a finding o^ fact without which such a
negotiation could not succeed. He submitted the following conclu-
sions for adoption:
(1) That an unnotified minefield was laid in the Corfu
Straits by the Albanian Government or with its connivance
resulting in serious injury to His Majesty's ships and loss
of life and injury to their crews.
(2) That the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments
should settle the dispute between them on the basis of the
Council* 8 finding in (1) above, and that, in the event of
a failure to settle, either party may apply to the Council
for further consideration of the matter.
(3) That the Security Council will retain this dispute
on its agenda until both parties certify that it has been
settled to their satisfaction.
(4) That, since the laying of mines in peacetime with-
out notification is unjustified and an offence against
humanity, and since it is the duty o^ governments to remove
promptly mines laid in time of war, the Security Council
reminds all States, whether members of the United Nations
or not, that it is incumbent on them to sweep or permit to
be swept all parts of their territorial waters where there
is reason to suspect the presence o f mines.29
The Albanian case was presented by Mr. Kapo at the 109th meeting.
Mr. Kapo asked why the British request received on 10 January, 1947,
was immediately placed on the agenda of the Security Council whereas
the Albanian request had not yet been considered. This point was not
dealt with in subsequent debate, conceivably because it was not relevant
and because there was no prejudice to Albania's case, in spite of
Kapo's implication.
Mr. Kapo continued with the Albanian version of the incidents.
29. Ibid ., p. 306.

21
He introduced the Greek civil war as a factor in Albania's militaris-
tic posture and made a long speech about the role o* the British
military missions in Albania vis a vis the Communist government, a
role which, according to Mr. Kapo, was responsible *"or the deterior-
ation in United Kingdom—Albanian relations. As Sir Alexander
Cadogan stated in reply, the lengthy description of Albanian griev-
ances in this speech only served to strengthen the probability of
Albanian connivance in the mining of British vessels. The first stage
in the substantive handling of the dispute, therefore, consisted of
the presentation of the case of each of the parties by means of speech-
es before the Security Council.
Examination of the press reaction to these speeches is useful
at this point in providing historical perspective. The issue aroused
little interest among American commentators. There was good factual
coverage of the debate in the Security Council but the American press
carried no editorial comment. The dispute also received good cover-
age in the British press. The Irish Times on 20 February devoted its
leading article to the subject and said: "We have no particular inter-
est in the verdict. We do, however, have a deep interest in the fact
that the British Government invoked the international authority of
the United Nations in the cases of Albania and Palestine." An arti-
cle in the Moscow New Times alleged that the incident had been fabri-
cated by the United Kingdom to inflame the already embittered relations
30
between the countries.
30. U.N. Secretariat, Survey of Opinion on the United Nations. No. 8 .
Vol. II/8 (24 February, 1947).
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After the presentation by each party o** Its side of the dispute,
the Security Council began to debate its competence to deal with the
matter under the Charter. The issue was opened by an Australian pro-
posal for the establishment of a subcommittee to examine the matter
for the Security Council in order to expedite the handling of the case
and eliminate extraneous considerations. Australia accompanied its
proposal by submitting a resolution that the Security Council appoint
a subcommittee to examine all the evidence and make a report to the
31
Security Council. Thus the Council was provided with a sort of
dummy question around which it could debate the real issue, that of
its competence. The President o*" the Council, Mr. F. van Langenhove,
of Belgium, called attention to Rule 33 o^ the procedural rules of
the Security Council requiring that the discussion be confined to the
motion on appointment o*" a subcommittee, but this rule was not strict-
ly enforced and the main arguments were on the competence of the
32
Council. The U.S.S.R. and Poland argued that peaceful means of
settling the dispute outside the United Nations were not exhausted and
that since there was no threat to the maintenance o^ peace and secur-
ity, the Security Council could not consider the matter. The United
Kingdom reply was that the former Albanian proposal of a mixed commis-
sion was not intended to settle the main issue and therefore could not
be cited as an Albanian attempt at peaceful settlement that had been
31. U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records . No. 18, 111th
Meeting, (February 24, 1947) p. 364.
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rejected by the United Kingdom. This mixed commission would have
been dealing with a question already settled on an international basis
by the Mediterranean Routing Instructions. The Albanian replies to
the United Kingdom notes had shown at once, said Sir Alexander, that
there was no hope at all of an amicable settlement between the two
33
nations without outside assistance.
A point o*" order was raised during this debate by the United
Kingdom representative, the question being whether as a party to this
dispute he could vote on the question of the appointment of a sub-
committee, a question which he took to be procedural. The represen-
tative of the U.S.S.R. argued that the Council's decision and all
others relating to the dispute or its handling were substantive from
the moment the dispute was adopted as an agenda item. The President
of the Security Council ruled that the barring o^ the parties from
voting by Article 27 of the Charter related only to decisions taken
by the Council under Chapter III of the Charter, and that his ruling
was, therefore, that a party could not be barred from voting on the
establishment of a subcommittee such as that proposed by the Australian
delegate. The complete avoidance in his ruling o^ a statement regard-
ing the procedural aspect o* the decision is an example o*" the hedging
that enables a political body to survive questions that might split a
legalistic deliberation irrevocably. The President went as far as
necessary to provide a clear ruling and not an inch further, avoiding
the focus of difference as well as he could. The subcommittee was
33. Ibid ., p. 385.
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voted for and appointed on 27 February, 1947, the Soviet Union, Poland,
34
and Syria abstaining. The members o^ the committee vere selected,
after a general expression o^ opinion on the part o* most members, by
the President whose selection was then approved by vote of the Coun-
35
cil. The United Kingdom voluntarily retrained from this vote.
In appointing this subcommittee, the Security Council in e^ect af-
firmed its competence in the matter.
The argument that the continuance of a dispute is not likely
to endanger the maintenance of peace and security has be°n put for-
ward in many cases. Brazil in particular has argued forcefully that
a dispute should only become the object of the Council's consideration
if its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. In another case the Brazilian representa-
tive stated: "To seek redress in the Security Council before the
traditional means of settlement have been exhausted would amount to
transferring to that body all the diplomatic difficulties resulting
36
from the relations between States." Such a restricted view was
not taken in this case and has not generally been taken by other mem-
bers of the Security Council. It remains a serviceable public
34. The reasons ^or the Syrian abstention were not clear at the time
as the representative of this country did not express himself in the
Council. Mr. Lange o*" Poland who had voted for the adoption o^ the
agenda, had been replaced by Mr. Mochalowski, but he returned to later
sessions. U.N. Security Council, op. clt .. No. 21, 114th Meeting
(27 February, 1947), p. 432.
35. Ibid., p. 438.
36. U.N. Security Council, Second year, Official Records . No. 80, 189th
Meeting (August 20, 1947), pp. 2105 ff., quoted in Leland M. Goodrich and
Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of Peace and Secur -










argument against the consideration of disputes which from the point
of view of any State, it is politically undesirable to discuss.
The establishment of the subcommittee introduced a procedural
point worthy of notice. One authoritative commentary asserts that
the establishment of the subcommittee o^ the Security Council on the
question, although viewed with no great enthusiasm by Albania, was
37
not blocked by the Soviet Union. This is true but misleading for
in fact the Soviet Union attempted to block the subcommittee but was
prevented from doing so by the President's ruling on the voting rules
of the Council.
The subcommittee mandate was quite general in nature. It was
set forth in the Australian resolution, by which the subcommittee was
to be appointed to "examine all the available evidence concerning the
above mentioned incident and make a report to the Security Council
38
not later than 3 March 1947. M
3. The Subcommittee of the Security Council
The Corfu Channel Case at this point hinged on a number of
disputed facts regarding alleged past causes of conduct. These facts,
if determined, would be used to further ascertain whether Albania was
or was not responsible for the damage by mines to the British vessels
in the Strait, The subcommittee^ instructions le^t it complete lee-
way in an entirely broad field o^ action. It was not restricted as
to what evidence it might use but, on the contrary, enjoined to examine
37. Ibid ., p. 187.
38. U.N. Security Council, Second Tear, Official Records No. 17, 110th
Meeting (20 February, 1947), p. 364. The date was later changed to
10 March, 1947 because of the delay caused by debate.
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all available evidence. It was not asked to recommend nor were the
facts which it was to determine defined. Thus the subcommittee was
left to interpret its own function as well as further the Security
Council's actions. It was composed of Mr. ^duardo Zuleta Angel of
Colombia as chairman, Mr. Hasluck of Australia, and Mr. Lange of
Poland
.
In returning the submittee report, each member spoke before
the Security Council, giving his individual views. Mr. Angel first
described the subcommittee's interpretation of its duties as being
that o^ a rapporteur which had carefully analyzed and studied the
allegations and counter-allegations of the parties concerned so as to
introduce order, method and system into the study of the problem
without actually submitting any conclusions or facts. The subcommit-
tee' s analysis had reduced the dispute to two questions upon which the
Security Council should concentrate. These were;
(1) Did a minefield exist in the swept channel oppo-
site Saranda Bay on 22 October, or did it not?
(2) Was this minefield laid by Albania or with the
connivance of the Albanian Government or was it not? 3^
The report of the subcommittee itself indicated the narrowness
of agreement achieved even in the privacy of such committee delibera-
40
tion. With regard to the damages and loss of life suffered by the
British ships, the report stated that no conflicting evidence existed.
However, no agreement had been reached concerning, the existence o^ the
39. Ibid .. No. 27, 120th Meeting (20 March, 1948), p. 544.
40. U.N. Security Council, Second Tear, Official Records Supplements,
No. 10, Annex 22.
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minefield, nor whether the mines which had caused the damage were
part of a field located in the subsequent sweeping operations. The
Polish member prepared an appendix to the report in support of his
opinion that the report did not fulfill the task set by the Security
41
Council in that it was not a report "on the facts o^ the case."
In their speeches incident to returning the report, the
Colombian and Australian members stated that their conclusions were
that the minefield must have been known to Albania, although there
was not sufficient proof to allow a conclusion that Albania had laid
it. The Polish representative stated that the evidence did not sup-
port the accusations that had been made against Albania, that there
was little that the Security Council could do, and suggested that it
would be appropriate to invoke Article 33 of the Charter calling upon
43
the parties to settle their dispute by the means listed in that article.
The subcommittee held a total of ten meetings. Representatives
of the parties to the dispute and the Greek representative to the
United Nations were questioned. There is no explanation in the United
Nations documentation for the failure of the French Government to allow
Commander Mestre, the foreign observer who accompanied the maneuvering
expedition on IS and 13 November, to be examined as was requested by
43
the subcommittee. Upon the return of this report at its 120th meet-
41. Ibid
. . Appendix I.
42. U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Hecords . No. 27, 120th
Meeting (20 March, 1947), pp. 556-557.
43. The French Ambassador's letter is reproduced in the subcommittee
report. Captain Mestre appeared later in the Court hearings.
J6 C.
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ing on March 20, 1947, the Security Council resumed its debate on the
subject.
4. The United Kingdom Resolution
The allegations attached to the report by Poland by means of
the Polish appendix set off Security Council criticism which was led
by the United Kingdom. In conclusion to this speech, the United
Kingdom representative introduced a resolution which carried a find-
ing of Albanian connivance and a recommendation that the parties
44
settle their dispute on the basis of that finding. Ensuing debate
centered on that resolution. The Albanian representative, Mr. Hysni
Kapo, had continued to sit in the meetings of the Security Council
and now spoke at length on the whole matter without introducing any
new considerations. He was supported by the Soviet delegate. The
Belgian, Australian, and United States delegates expressed their
agreement with the Colombian delegate's fladinga as stated in the sub-
committee's report. The United States proposed two amendments to
45
the United Kingdom resolution. The first of these made the respon-
sibility of the Albanian government stem from its knowledge of the
mines rather than from its connivance in laying them. The second
amendment deleted a provision of the resolution containing a general
reminder to all States that it was incumbent upon them to sweep or
permit to be swept all parts of their territorial waters where there
44. Ibid., p. 567.
45. Ibid ., p. 589.
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is reason to suspect the presence of mines. This amendment has been
used to demonstrate avoidance by the Security Council of the setting
up o*" legal precepts o** international conduct as compared with the
46
Assembly, although the substitution proposed in this amendment, to
the effect that the Security Council:
1. Considers that the laying of mines in peace time
without notification is unjustified and an o^ense
against humanity.
seems to support standards of international conduct without dealing
specifically with the application of international law to minesweep-
ing, a separate matter not directly connected with the dispute. As
it turned out later in the Court proceedings that the minesweeping
operation conducted by the United Kingdom was a violation of Albanian
sovereignty, an expression by the Security Council on the duties of a
state in this regard might have been contradicted.
A second amendment was proposed by Mr. Farodi, the delegate of
47
France. Mr. Parodi agreed with the conclusions expressed by the
resolution but wished the resolution to express more clearly the steps
of reasoning by which the conviction had been reached. As written
it seemed to imply that the Security Council had clear proo** that
Albania had knowledge of the minefield. The expression introduced
was, "that this minefield could not have been laid without the knowl-
edge of the Albanian government. w
46. Goodrich and Simons, pp. cit .. 209.
47. U.N. Security Council, op. cit .. p. 596.
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The United Kingdom accepted the two amendments proposed.
Introduction of such amendments provides some evidence that the con-
clusions emhodied in a final resolution have be«n reached by indepen-
dent reasoning.
The Polish delegate introduced another resolution at this
point which asserted that all peaceful means o^ settlement had not
been exhausted and called upon the parties to settle the dispute by
means of their own choice, as provided in Article 33 of the Charter.
Debate continued until the amended United Kingdom resolution was
brought to a vote. This resolution in its final -form stated that
the laying of mines in peacetime without notification is unjustified
and an offense against humanity, that an unnotified minefield had
caused damage and loss of life to His Majesty's ships and crews, a
minefield that could not have been laid without the knowledge o^ the
Albanian government, and recommended that the two parti s settle their
dispute on the basis of these findings. This resolution was defeated,
48
failing to obtain the affirmative vote o^ the Soviet Union. Poland
joined the U.S.S.fi. in voting against it and Syria abstained, presumably
for the reason expressed in a speech just prior to the vote, that of a
lack of direct factual evidence. to support the finding. The resolution
that had been proposed by Poland was now withdrawn by that delegate
apparently in the hope that the case would be dismissed. When the
President ruled that the question would remain on the agenda, the Soviet
49
delegate attacked this ruling. A vote on this procedural matter was
48. Ibid., p. 609.
49. Ibid ., p. 611.
.
31
forestalled by adjournment on a motion o^ tbe United Kingdom.
At the 125th Meeting on 3 April, 1947, the Corfu Channel Case
was again taken up by the Security Council. The United Kingdom
delegate reviewed the case and then introduced a resolution which
recoamonded tnat the parties to the dispute refer it to tbe Interna-
50
tional Court of Justice. This resolution waB supported by the
United States. It was also supported by Brazil, but the Brazilian
delegate criticised the handling of the case up to that point on the
legalistic grounds referred to previously. It was the ^ear o* this
delegate that the Security Council would become a louer court ^or all
disputes oetween nations. He felt that the Security Council, a
political body, could not be limited, as a court is, to considerations
of proofs, facts, circumstances, and lavs, but that its limitations
lay in the nature of disputes with which it would deal and that these
must endanger the maintenance of peace and security. Therefore, in
sucn cases as the one at hand, the Security Council should immediately
refer the parties to the International Court of Justice rather than
51
deal with the substance of the question itself. Other speeches
contained expressions which bore on the effect of the resolution com-
bineu with obligations of the parties under the Charter. The Austral-
ian delegate, Colonel Hodgson, seemed to take the opposite from
the Brazilian's view. He asserted that "the Council is intended to
occupy a position comparable to that of the International Court of
52
Justice in relation to justiceable disputes. !l He reminded Albania




52. Ibid., 127th Meeting (9 April. 1947), p. 721.
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that if It failed to appear before the Court a judgment could he
given against it. He concluded that the Security Council recommen-
dation would be binding and that Albania was bound by it because of
her acceptance of the obligations of a member.
The Soviet representative insisted that whereas it would have
been more proper to bring the case to the International Court of
Justice originally, the investigation had revealed no basis for
53
"dragging Albania before the International Court o^ Justice." The
President, speaking as the representative of China, answered the argu-
ment that the case should have gone to the International Court of
Justice originally, by pointing out that whereas Albania could not
originally have been compelled to appear, not being a member o^ the
United Nations, she was now bound by both the United Nations Charter
and the Statute of the Court. The United Kingdom's resolution
passed with all votes affirmative except for the Soviet Union and
Polish abstentions. A general debate on the powers and duties of
the Security Council inspired by the restrictive Brazilian position,
ended inconclusively and the Security Council's role in the Corfu
54
Channel Case came to an end.
Article 33 of the Charter was designed to insure that the
parties to a dispute would make an effort to settle the dispute
53. Ibid ., p. 725.
54. The Security Council had dealt with the case in the following
meetings: 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 107th, 109th, 111th, 114th, 120th,




before referring it to the Security Council. The majority of
the Council supported the view o^ the United Kingdom that the cir-
cumstances required the Council to do more than merely urge the par-
ties to reach a settlement.




THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OP JUSTICE AND THE
CORFU CHANNEL CASE
1. The Jurisdictional Dispute
The International Court of Justice was established concurrently
with the United Nations, as provided for by the United Nations Charter
and the Statute of the Court which is annexed to and forms an integral
part of the Charter. The Court met first in April and May, 1946,
when a Solemn Inaugural Session was held. During this period the
judges drew up the Rules of the Court and elected the Chamber for sum-
mary procedure. It met again in February-March, 1947, for the annual
election of the Chamber and to deal with other administrative matters.
In May, 1947, the Court received notification of the first case that
56
was to come before it, the Cor^u Channel Case.
The Security Council resolution calling upon the parties to
submit their dispute to the Court had been adopted on 9 April, 1947.
On 22 May, 1947, the United Kingdom addressed an application to the
Court for consideration of the case. There seems to have been no
question raised of the obligations of the United Kingdom in this re-
spect but actually, under subsequent interpretation, there was only a
moral obligation to carry out the Security Council's recommendation.






The United Kingdom in arguing for the jurisdiction of the Court took
the position that recommendations of the Security Council were "binding
hut this riev was not supported. How did Albania stand now? Albania
had accepted the obligations of a member of the United Nations in
appearing at the Security Council, but ae in the case o^ the United
Kingdom, this obligation was only moral, and a considerable degree
less than that of the United Kingdom. There was no other basis for
the Court's jurisdiction as far as Albania was concerned. It must
be noted that had Albania initiated proceedings in the Court, the
United Kingdom would have been bound to appear, having accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
One may speculate upon the effects of the side issue of
Albania' 8 candidacy for membership in the United Nations, upon her
actions with respect to the Court. On 9 July, 1947 the Security
Council referred the application of Alhania, together with those of
several other states, for membership in the United Nations, to its
Committee on the Admission o*" New Members. The actions o* Albania
with respect to the Security Council Resolution were a natural con-
sideration for this Committee which was instructed to present its
report on 10 August, 1947. On 18 August, 1947, the Security Council
57
voted not to recommend Albania ^or membership. Among the consider-
ations mentioned in the plenary session was the mining of the Corfu
58
Channel.
57. U.N. Security Council, Second Year, Q^icial Records . No. 179,
186th Meeting (18 August, 1947), p. 2037.
58. Ibid., pp. 2035-2036.
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The claim of the Government o^ the United Kingdom aa set forth
in its Application, was as follows:
(1) That the Albanian Government either caused to be
laid or had knowledge o^ the laying of the mines.
(2) That two British destroyers were seriously damaged
and forty-four personnel o*' the Royal Navy lost their
lives because o*** the mines so laid.
(3) That the loss and damage were due to the failure
of the Albanian Government to fulfill its international
obligations and act in accordance with the dictates of
humanity.
(4) That the Court shall decide that the Albanian
Government is internationally responsible for the said
loss and injury and is under an obligation to make repa-
ration or pay compensation to the Government o? the United
Kingdom therefor; and
(5) That the Court shall determine the reparation or
compensation. ^9
The first communication received from Albania by the Court was
60
a letter dated 2 July, 1947. This letter, addressed to the Regis-
trar of the Court, was dated at Tirana and signed by Hysni Kapo,
Deputy Minister *"or Foreign Affairs of Albania. The letter, which
was to be the basis for the assertion of Jurisdiction by the Court,
made the following observations:
(1) The United Kingdom was not entitled to refer the
dispute to the Court by unilateral application.
(2) Article 25 of the U.N. Charter cannot be used to
justify the United Kingdom proceeding, since it relates
only to "decisions."
59. International Court of Justice, Pleadings. Oral Arguments. Docu-
ments. The Corfu Channel Case . Vol. I, p. 9.









(3) The Albanian Government "would be within it» rights"
in holding that a Special Agreement between the two par-
ties was a nece8eary preliminary to Court consideration.
(4) The Albanian Government accepts the Security Coun-
cil's recommendation and is prepared, notwithstanding the
irregularity of the United Kingdom's action, to appear be-
fore the Court while making explicit reservations about the
manner in which the case was brought to the Court and em-
phasizing that its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction
cannot constitute a precedent for the future.
The letter concluded by appointing as agent for Albania, Kr.
Kahreman Tlli
.
On the basis of the Special Application received from the
United Kingdom and the Albanian letter described above, the Court set
the time limits for United Kingdom Memorial and Albanian Counter-
61
memorial, as 1 October, 1947, and 10 December, 1947, respectively.
The United Kingdom memorial was submitted as required. As previous-
ly noted, the Security Council had disposed of Albania's application
for membership on 10 August, 1947, more than a month after the Albanian
letter of 2 July, 1947. There is thus a circumstantial indication
62
that Albania's "Preliminary Objection," received by the Court on 9
December, 1947, the day before the Counter-memorial was due, reflected
a change of policy toward the United Nations based on the rejection
of her application for membership.
Under the Rules of the Court, before the hearings on a case
begin, a party may file a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of
the Court. In such cases, the proceedings on the merits of the case
61. International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgmen ts, Advisory
Opinions, and Orders. 1947-1948
. pp. 5-6.
62. International Court of Justice, Pleadings. Oral Arguments. Docu-
ments. The Corfu Channel Case . Vol. II, p. 9.
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are suspended until this preliminary point is resolved. The prelim-
inary objection raised by Albania was on the ground o* the inadmissi-
bility of the United Kingdom's application as the means of bringing
the case to the Court. It insisted that a Special Agreement was a
63
necessary preliminary. It was thus that a number of important
rulings concerning jurisdiction came to be written in the first case
before the International Court.
When a preliminary objection has been made, the Court sets
limits *"or the submission of instruments known as observations and
submissions. In these appeared the United Kingdom's written agree-
ment for jurisdiction. In public sittings held on February 26th,
27th and 28th, and on March 1st, 2nd, and 5th, 1948, the Court heard
oral arguments on behalf of the respective parties. Dr. Igor Daxner,
President of a Chamber of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, was
designated as the Albanian judge, ad hoc .
The argument of the United Kingdom in support of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court was based upon two separate lines of reasoning.
Sir Hartley Shawcross, Counsel, requested that they be considered
independently. One foundation of the argument was an interpretation
of the United Nations Charter which would have made Albanian accept-
ance of jurisdiction mandatory because o*" the Security Council reso-
lution and her acceptance o? the obligations of a member. The other
63. Article 40, paragraph 1. of the Statute 0* the Court!
1. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be,
either by the notification of the special agreement or by a
written application addressed to the Registrar. In either




argument for jurisdiction was the Albanian letter of 2 July.
The Albanian argument followed the lines set ^orth in its pre-
liminary objection. The Court's judgment, by ^i^teen votes against
one (Judge Daxner), rejected the Preliminary Objection submitted by
the Albanian Government and set the time limits for the filing of sub-
64
sequent pleadings. There were two separate opinions appended.
One was Judge Daxner' dissent. The other was a separate opinion of
Judges Basdevant, Alvarez, Winiarski, Zoricic, De Visscher, Badani
Pasha, and Krylov, who concurred in the judgment but wiehed to add to
the opinion. This added separate opinion is of importance ^or the
suggestion that it contains as to a legal interpretation of Article 25
of the United Nation's Charter. These seven judges expressed the
wish that the other argument concerning jurisdiction had been dealt
with by the Court. In their opinion, the United Kingdom had not
established that compulsory jurisdiction existed ^or Albania because
of the action of the Security Council. In this way the judgment of
the International Court of Justice on March 25, 1948, supported the
interpretation of the Charter which distinguished between Security
Council "recommendations" and "decisions," finding the -former not bind-
ing.
One prominent legal writer stated that from this judgment it can
64. International Court o? Justice, Reports o** Judgments. Advisory





be soundly inferred that if in the future, a State desires to object
to the jurisdiction, it should do so at the first possible opportunity
65
and in clear and unmistakable language."
In the same article the Charter interpretation was dealt with
in more specific terms. The enforceability o^ a recommendation,
said the writer, had been contused with its binding e-^ect. In the
66
Charter a recommendation as to terms of settlement (i.e. merits)
possesses no obligatory effect -"or the parties, but nothing in the
preparatory work refers to a recommendation dealing only with Jgroced-
67
urs of settlement. It is conceivable that a recommendation as to
terms should stand on a di^^erent footing than one as to procedure
only, but it must be admitted that no such distinction appears *"rom
the language.
In anticipation of the judgment o*" the Court, the two parties
had prepared a "Special Agreement" which they now requested the Court
to accept as the basis for -further proceedings in the case. This the
68
Court did in an order made on March 26, 1948. This agreement sub-
mitted to the Court for decision the following questions:
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law ^or
the explosions which occurred on the 22nd October, 1946 in
Albanian waters and ^or the damage and loss of human li^e
which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay
65. John M. Jones, "Cor-^u Channel Case Jurisdiction," Grotius Society,








(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law
violated the sovereignty of the Albanian Peoples* Repub-
lic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian
waters on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th
November, 1946, and is there any duty to give satisfac-
tion?
The Court had taken from May 22, 1947 until March 25, 1948 to
assert its jurisdiction. It returned a judgment on the merits on
9 April, 1949, having heard extensive arguments and made its own
investigation of certain technical matters.
The Albanian Government designated Bohuelav Beer, Doctor of
Law and Processor in the Faculty of Law at Brno, as the judge ad hoc
•''or the remainder o*" the case. Mr. Beer took the place of Mr. Daxner.
In order to deal with the technical problems which arose, the Court
made use of a Technical Commission, appointed by order of December,
1948. This Commission made written replies to specific questions,
visited the scene of the incidents and was further interrogated by
the Court. The parties were allowed to file observations with re-
gard to the statements of the experts. One o"p the more important
conclusions of this Commission, based upon experiments actually con-
ducted, was that "...to place a minefield accurately, as was done,
requires a reasonably good visibility so that definite cross-bearings
on the coast can be taken, as there is only one lighthouse in the
vicinity." And, "If done in daylight, it can unhesitatingly be said
that the operation must have been noticed by the Albanian authori-
69
ties."
69. International Court of Justice, Reports o** Judgments. Advisory
Opinions, and Orders. 1949 . p. 149.
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2. Judgment on the Merita
The judgment of the Court was stated in two parts, replying to
70
the corresponding questions posed by the Special Agreement. The
first part, by a vote of eleven to *lve, gave judgment that the
Peoples' Republic of Albania was responsible under international law
for the explosions and for the damage and loss of human li^e which
resulted therefrom. (By ten votes to six, the Court reserved for
further consideration the assessment o^ the amount o*" compensation.)
On the second question, by fourteen votes to two, the Court
gave judgment that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty
of the Peoples' Republic of Albania by reason of acts in Albanian
waters on October 22nd, 1946, and unanimously, that this sovereignty
was violated in the course o^ the operations on the 12th and 13th o^
November, 1946, and that this declaration by the Court constituted in
itself appropriate satisfaction. The judges dissenting in the first
part o-f the Judgment relating to Albanian responsibility, were Judges
Winiarski, Badawi Pasha, Kaylov, and Azevedo, and ad hoc Judge "Ecer.
The opinion has been called "notable -for relying upon broad principles
of law, apparently deemed to be self-evident and stated without cita-
71
tion of precedent or authority." What were the grounds for dissent?
70. Ibid., p. 36.
71. Quincy Vf right, "The Cor^u Channel Case," American Journal of







The opinion of Judge Asevedo was a lengthy one. He agreed
in finding Albania responsible, but not that the Court could determine
the amount of compensation. It is interesting to note that his opin-
ion contains a sentence which asserts that "Albania was bound by the
72
Security Council decision to accept the Court's jurisdiction." He
dissented from the majority in taking the restrictive view of the
Special Agreement, stating that it was not a question of competence
for the Court but one o-f determining the contents o*" the petitnnu
The adoption of a special agreement, he said, presupposes mutual re-
nunciations, limiting the effect o^ the Court's decision to the main
fact of recognition of responsibility, and regarding essentially the
73
purpose of international justice as being to declare the right.
Judge Basdevant accepted the whole o^ the operative part o^
74
the judgment but stated that he could not accept the reasons given
by the Court in support o^ its jurisdiction to assess the amount of
compensation.
Judge Winiarski of Poland stated in his dissent that a binding
of such exceptional gravity against a State required a degree of proof
which had not been attained in this case. He also believed that, in
submitting a special agreement, the parties had put an end to the pro-
ceedings instituted by the unilateral application, and therefore the
72. International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments. Advisory
Opinions, and Orders, 1949, p. 90.





Court would not adjudge compensation.
Judge Badawi Pasha based his dissent on the quality of the
circumstantial evidence. Said he, "...the most reliable doctrine
takes the view that proof by circumstantial evidence is regarded as
successfully established only when other solutions would imply cir-
cumstances wholly astonishing, unusual, and contrary to the way of
the world." In his opinion the evidence of the experts remained
conjectural. He did not find that the Special Agreement allowed
the Court to decide what compensation should be paid the United King-
dom and the Court could not go beyond that agreement.
Judge Krylov disagreed that (a) connivance had been proved,
(b) cognizance of the mines had been proved, or (c) that the culpa
of Albania had been proved. He considered that the Court should
interpret the Special Agreement restrictively and not adjudge com-
pensation. At no point did he deal with the basis of the affirma-
tive majority finding that Albania must have had knowledge of the
minefield.
Judge Zoricic, in an opinion differing from the other dissents
in its extreme brevity, found that there was insufficient factual evi-
75
dence to support Albania's knowledge of the presence of mines.
Judge Beer's opinion is the most direct refutation of the Court's
finding. He concluded that the Albanian government's knowledge of
the minelaying had not been judicially established, and that the Court
should keep strictly to the terms of the Special Agreement.
75 • ibid ., pp. 37-38.
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On the second question put by the Special Agreement regarding
the violation of Albanian sovereignty on the two separate occasions,
the only dissent was with regard to the incident of the 22nd of
October, 1947. This passage by British ships on the day of the
mining was •found by fourteen votes to two not to have been a viola-
tion of Albanian sovereignty. The Court found unanimously that the
subsequent minesweeping operation had constituted such a violation.
Judge Krylov, In his dissent regarding the passage of October
22, 1946, found that the British ships were misusing the right of
passage by attempting to intimidate the Albanian authorities with a
76
display of naval power. Judge Azevedo , on the other hand, asserted
that no such right existed for warships as distinguished from mer-
chant ships. Judge Beer, in his opinion, stated that there was no
conclusive law on the subject of innocent passage so that the actions
of both parties could be legally Justified.
The above summation of the dissenting opinions is necessarily
brief and contains omissions. It is presented not to illustrate the
Judicial points considered by the dissenting judges, which were of a
great number, but for a brief examination as to difference of opinion
as among the sixteen judges of different nationalities. In such an
examination there is a pattern of division between the judges of
Soviet bloc origin and others. The main issue that was resolved by
the Court as distinguished from the legal questions put to it, was
the question of Albanian responsibility. The fact that this was the




main issue is attested by the fact that Security Council deliberations
had concerned themselves mainly with this question, and that much of
the greater part of the opinions, stated jointly or separately, dealt
with this aspect of the case. All four of the Soviet bloc judges
dissented from the majority opinion which was in opposition to the
interests of a Communist state. It is the unanimity of the Commun-
ist vote against the majority opinion which is of significance.
This significance is perhaps accentuated rather than diminished by
the dissent of Badawi Pasha, who, in political terms, disagreed with
the West. It must be added that in the written dissents, there is
little duplication and every evidence of independent reasoning as
among the dissenters. Might one conclude that a Communist judge is
on his own in justifying his opinion if not in arriving at it?
The opinions o^ the Court were o* a different pattern with
regard to the second question of the Special Agreement, regarding
Albanian sovereignty. This opinion dealt with two separate incidents.
The Court was unanimous in one finding. The dissents in the other
were the Soviet Krylov and the Brazilian Aaevedo. There is no simi-
larity whatever in the judicial writing in which these dissents are
expressed. Judge Aaevedo' s opinion seems to be a sincere and honest
attempt to ascertain the law regarding innocent passage of warships,
in which he arrives at a different conclusion from the majority.
Judge Kaylov, on the other hand, charges that the United Kingdom
violated this right by attempting to intimidate Albania. In doing







Another view is expressed by Professor Oliver J. Lissitsyn,
who finds it more noteworthy that the judges o* the nationalities of
the Communist states did not on all occasions take the cosition most
favorable to the contentions of those states. The Soviet, Polish,
and Jugoslav judges joined the majority in upholding the jurisdiction
of the Court against the objections of Albania. The Polish and
Yugoslav concurred in the view that Albanian sovereignty had not
been violated by the peaceful passage, differing here from the Soviet
and Brazilian judges. The Polish and Yugoslav judges concurred in
assessing the amount of compensation, from which the Soviet judge
dissented.
This discussion would be incomplete without reference to the
78
separate opinion o* Judge Alvarez. This opinion is in concurrence
with the majority, but Judge Alvares wished to give prominence to
certain considerations o-? a legal character in support o^ that judg-
ment. In this opinion Judge Alvares advances a theory of a new
international law founded on social Interdependence , a law which
often comes into collision with the "old international law." He
related to this the new function of thS Court, a function not express-
ly conferred on the court which preceded it, i.e., "that o** creating
and formulating new precepts, both for old problems where no rules
exist and also for new problems. 11
77. Oliver J. Lissit2yn, The International Court of Justioe (New York,
1951), pp. 56-57.
78. Ibid ., p. 39.
79. Ibid., p. 40.
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A criticism o*" this opinion and the theory which it sett forth,
while a worthy project, is beyond the scope of this essay. It will
suffice to indicate its departure from accepted ideas by observing that
these ideas hold that the peculiar quality o^ law which makes it a
necessity in any political society, resides not in its subject matter
nor ethical content, but in its stability. Law gives to society that
element of fixity and regularity and continuity without which no
coherent life is possible. Judge Alvarea' theory seems to be a
serious attempt to deal with the fact that contemporary international
law has become a bulwark o* the existing order and has su^ered a cor-
responding decline in the respect it receives.
3. The Judgment as to Compensation
The Court had reserved this judgment pending receipt of Albanian
observations on the amount demanded from it by the United Kingdom.
By a Court order, June 25th, 1949 was set as the time limit **or these
observations. In another order, this date was extended to July 1st,
1949, at the request o*" the Albanian Government. In an order made on
November 9th, 1949, the Court directed the examination of the United
Kingdom claims by naval experts designated by the Court, the Albanian
80
Government having failed to defend its case. On 15 December, 1949,
the Court fixed the amount of compensation due at L843.947, approximately
that claimed by the United Kingdom. The amount awarded was based on
the replacement cost of the destroyed HMS Saomarez . cost of repair to
the destroyer HMS V olage . and the cost of pensions and other grants made
80. Ibid., p. 238.
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by the United Kingdom to the victims and their dependents. Judge
Krylov and Judge leer dissented.
Albania, as has been noted, did not appear before the Court
in this part of the case, although the ad hoc judge, Ecer, remained
seated in these hearings and voted. She has refused to pay the com-
pensation and the United Kingdom has attempted to recover the sum by
other means, one of which became an issue in the Monetary Gold Case
81
brought to the International Court by Italy in May, 1953. An amount
of gold that had been removed from Borne by Germany during the Second
World War, became subject to conflicting claims. The question as to
whether the gold belonged to Italy or Albania was submitted to arbitra-
tion under an understanding between the United States, the United King-
dom, and Prance that if the Albanian claim were to be upheld, the gold
would be given not to Albania but to the United Kingdom in partial
satisfaction of the claims arising from the Corfu Channel Case. At
the same time it was left open for Italy to apply to the International
Court of Justice for a decision as to whether, by certain claims of
Italy against Albania, there would remain another Italian claim and,
if so, whether this claim of the British should receive priority.
The arbitrator upheld the Albanian claim in the first case and Italy
brought the issue to the Court, but the Court decided on June 15,
1954, that it could not adjudicate the Italian claim in the absence
of Albanian consent.
The obligation of Albania to pay the sum seems uncontestable.
81. Goodrich and Simons. op. cit .. pp. 337-338.
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Article 94 of the Charter impose* upon Albania the obligation to com-
ply with the decisions of the Court in the Corfu Channel Case. It
further gives the United Kingdom recourse to the Security Council and
empowers the Security Council to make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
4. Principles Embodied in the Judgments
The Corfu Channel Case has been found notable by writers on
international law for the scope and number of the points of law that
appear from the judgments rendered. The following principles are
82
cited by John M. Jones as appearing in the judgment on merits:
(a) Evidence in International Law ; Where a charge of
exceptional gravity is brought against a state, conclusive
evidence establishing a high degree of certainty is re-
quired.
(b) Methods of Proof : Exclusive territorial control
exercised by a state has a bearing upon the method of
proof available to establish its knowledge o*" an unlawful
act. Another state must be allowed more liberal re-
course to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.
(c) Circumstantial "Bvidence : In international law
circumstantial evidence is subject to the criterion that
it may have no reason for reasonable doubt.
(d) Disclosure of Documents : The Court cannot derive
from refusal to disclose documents any conclusions dif-
fering from those to which the actual events gave rise.
(e) Responsibilities of States : These responsibilities
extend to giving an explanation and showing, up to a point,
what the State has done to investigate what prima facie
appears to be an act contrary to international law. Denial
will not suffice.
82. John M. Jones, "The Corfu Channel Case - Merits," British Yearbook
of International Law . Tol. 26, 1949, pp. 447-453.
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(f) Responsibilities of States : These responsibili-
ties include a mere omission if, as a result of that
omission, damage is sustained by another state in the
course of lawful activity.
(g) Damages : Where a special agreement empowers the
Court to decide whether compensation is due in respect
of the breach of international law, it also has jurisdic-
tion to decide whether reparation is due.
(h) Damages : The Court seems to accept the doctrine
that extenuating circumstances may mitigate the amount of
damages due in respect of a breach of international law.
(i) Straits in Maritime Law : States in time of
peace have the right to send their warships through
straits used for international navigation between two
parts of the high seas without the previous authorization
of a coastal state, provided that the passage is inno-
cent. Conversely, there is no right for a coastal state
to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace,
(j) Straits in Maritime Law : The decisive test of an
international strait is its geographical situation as
connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of
its being used for international navigation.
(k) Innocent Passage : A passage does not cease to
be innocent for the purpose of this rule because its pur-
pose is to assert a right which has been unjustly denied.
(1) Intervention and Self-heIp t The Court has con-
demned intervention. Self-help as distinguished from
self-defense is now no longer allowed.
(m) The Interpretation of Treaties and Special
Agreements : It is not necessary for a judge to use any
rules of interpretation.
(n) The Interpretation of Treaties and Special
Agreements : The Court used as elements in interpreta-
tion the history of the Special Agreement and the sub-
sequent attitude of the parties.
(o) Interpretation of Treaties and Special Agree-
ments : The Court interpreted the Special Agreement in




These point* have been repeated here for the purpose of indi-
cating the importance of the Corfu Channel Judgments in international






1, Special Featurea of the Case
In taking up the Corfu Channel dispute, the Security Council
became seized of a clearly drawn East-West dispute. The extent of
the agreement developed in Security Council discussion was that the
question was susceptible of solution on a legal basis and should,
therefore, be referred to the International Court of Justice. Voting
on the two resolutions placed before the Council was divided, the
Soviet bloc finding itself in isolated support of Albania.
Although in many cases there has been a feeling in the Council
that the parties concerned could better settle their dispute them-
selves, considerable difference has existed as to whether the Council
should Indicate how the settlement should take place. There have
been numerous occasions when members felt that a resolution should be
adopted but have considered that the terms of a particular proposal
83
went beyond the Council's authority. The Corfu Channel Case is
the only case which has been referred to the International Court of
Justice by virtue of a Security Council recommendation to the parties
to the dispute. In two other cases where some members advocated the
referral by the parties to the Court, the proposals failed to obtain
83. Goodrich and Simons, pp. clt .. pp. 278-279.
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the support necessary for adoption. Only six members voted in sup-
port of such a recommendation in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and less
than the required majority of the Assembly in consideration of the
treatment of Indians in South Africa. Opinion was expressed that
the Yugoslav complaint regarding Trieste and the National Chinese
charges against the Soviet Union were more suitable for consideration
84
by the Court, but nothing further was done in this direction.
It must be borne in mind that the recommendation for referral
to the Court in the Corfu Channel Case was only made after the Soviet
Union had vetoed a resolution that would have in itself constituted a
judgment. Undoubtedly the fact that the events under consideration
had passed and were not in the process of further development was a
large factor in the ability of the Council to deal at all with it.
The parties directly concerned have seldom agreed that a
matter was suitable for consideration by any organ of the United
Nations, In this case, Albania did accept the invitation to partici-
pate in Security Council discussion and eventually agreed with the
United Kingdom on the questions to be submitted to the Court. Even
these facts cannot stand independently, for Albania must certainly
have had its candidacy for membership in the United Nations as a con-
sideration, and the "Special Agreement" was an Albanian legal tactic
after the field of argument had been clearly shown in other hearings,
before the Court.
84. Goodrich and Simons, qp. clt .. p. 335.
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It is very unusual for states to allow a question involving
security interests to be brought forth for settlement on a legal basis.
In the case of the Corfu Channel, Albania did dispute the Jurisdiction
of the Court whereas the United Kingdom was the proposer of the Secur-
ity Council resolution. Jurisdiction was established only by a
Judgment of the Court, although it has been argued that Albania even-
tually intended to submit.
The large number of points of law established or affirmed
make the Corfu Channel Case prominent in all modern case-books of in-
ternational law. One of the reasons for the existence of this number
of points is the fact that the Court was called upon to settle four
separate issues. These were: its Jurisdiction, the two questions
asked in the "Special Agreement, n and the competence to adjudge the
amount of compensation. In addition, the Court was compelled to
evaluate a large mass of evidence leading to rulings on the use and
nature of evidence in international disputes.
In connection with the problem of evaluation evidence, the
International Court is authorized in Article 50 of its statute to entrust
to an Individual bureau, or commission, or other organization, the task
of making an inquiry on giving an expert opinion. Only in connection
85
with the Corfu Channel Case has the Court exercised this power.
Certain points of fact were contested by the parties. In order to
obtain an expert opinion, the Court, in an order of 17 December, 1948,
85. Goodrich and Simons, op. cit .. p. 174.
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defined these points and asked for an expert opinion from a committee
86
consisting of three naval officers. A report was made in writing
87
to the Court. This resulted in further questions which led to an
on the spot investigation, a second report, and individual questions
and replies in writing.
One of the most significant features of the case stems from
the Joint Separate Opinion rendered by the seven judges on the ques-
tion of the compulsory jurisdiction for Albania. This opinion in
rejecting the assertion of the United Kingdom that recommendations
of the Security Council were binding on members, supports this often
questioned thesis, although not with the full force of a Judgment
or advisory opinion, and must be considered in an interpretation of
the obligations of members under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter.
As a final element of singularity, the case carries the indi-
vidual opinion of Judge Alvarez of Chile. It is possible to attach
too much importance to this feature of the Court's judgment, but it
has a certain relevance to the entire proceedings and conceivably
would lead to certain conclusions on the part of state* s parties to
dispute as to what might be expected of the Court. The several ref-
erences to "new international law" would indicate that Judge Alvarez
at least thought that the case had been settled on law which had not
existed before and that the Court was qualified to make such law.
This is not a judicial process but a legislative one.
86. Commodore J. Bull, Royal Norwegian Navy, Commander S. 1. Foreshell,
Boyal Swedish Navy, and Lieutenant Commander S.J.W. Sllferrich, Royal
Netherlands Navy.
87. International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments. Advisory
Opinions, and Orders . 1949, p. 142.
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The main interest of the case in the procedural tense and
considered as a whole, stems from its bearing on the interpretation
of Chapter III of the United Nations Charter relating to the peaceful
settlement of disputes. A conservative interpretation of Chapter III
would still allow the United Kingdom, under Article 35(1) to bring a
dispute of the nature of the Corfu Channel dispute to the attention
of the Security Council, as one which might lead to international
friction. Such an interpretation would further, in acceptance of the
literal wording of Article 34 of the Charter, permit the Security
Council to investigate the dispute "in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security. 1* Prior to this de-
termination, there is no power provided for the Security Council to
deal with the dispute or situation. In order for the Security Coun-
cil even to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment
including legal settlement, it must be acting under the powers con-
ferred by Article 36 which restricts the field of action to "a dispute
of the nature referred to in Article 33 or a wituation of a like na-
ture." This is a dispute "the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of peace and security." In determining the
powers of the Security Council bestowed by the Charter, careful and
conservative reading of the text of Chapter VI leads to the conclusion
that it was written with the principle in mind that the main function
of the Security Council was the maintenance of peace and security and







and that the introduction for its consideration of additional issues
of a less serious nature should be restricted by the Charter.
A more literal interpretation of Chapter VI requires the in-
troduction of something that is not in the text, and that is either a
power to make recommendations on cases which fall short of endangering
international peace and security or a power to proceed without a spe-
cific determination as to the gravity of the dispute. The latter is
the power which the Security Council has preempted in its practice and
represents a liberal interpretation of Chapter VI in which the literal
wording of the text is not allowed to restrict the Security Council
from dealing with a particular dispute.
The question arises as to whether in dealing with a dispute
such as the Corfu Channel case, the Security Council does not tacitly
infer it to be a dispute which endangers international peace and secur-
ity, although it may not so resolve in a formal decision. This im-
plies a decision, even if informal, and there is no evidence that such
decisions take place. As a matter o^ fact, although the Soviet Union
in the Corfu Channel Case argued that the case should not be consid-
ered as it did not endanger international peace and security, the
argument of the United Kingdom was not in direct refutation of this
but rather that the Security Council was not restricted to such matters,
and that hence the argument of the Soviet Union had no validity. This,
in practice, has been the decision of the Council as a body.
This practice has established a pattern of officially ignoring
the point that the Charter requires a preliminary evaluation by the
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Council of a dispute to determine its relation to the maintenance of
peace and security. By doing this, the Council avoids much argument
as to precedent and preserves its privilege of dealing with all ques-
tions on a political basis rather than a legalistic one. There is
no question of the fact that this gives this important body a free-
dom of action that broadens its scope. There are two objections to
such a position. first, as was argued by the Brazilian member in
the Corfu Channel Case, the Council may thus open its proceedings to
any diplomatic difference that arises in a busy world, to the detri-
ment of its main function, the maintenance of peace and security.
This objection assumes that because the Council considers one dispute
it must deal with all others of like gravity which are brought before
it. However, this has not been the case, and the Council may ab-
stain from considering a case for political reasons as well as decide
to take it up for the same kind of reason. In this sense, the
establishment of great freedom of action for the Council has had no
adverse effect on its functioning to preserve peace and security.
The second objection is more serious. If such a body can ignore cer-
tain terras of the international covenant which gives it its legal
foundation, then it can deal similarly with other provisions. The
legal value of the agreement itself becomes less If it is not carried
out. This, it seems, it the precarious path along which all covenants
based upon political agreement must pass if they are to evolve so as
to survive changing circumstances and not be shattered by the first






The question of obligatory action by a non-member was not sub-
jected to interpretation once Albania had accepted the obligations of
a member. The questions rather revolved around what these obligations
were. In this case, therefore, the condition imposed by the Security
Council upon Albania, general as it was, seems to have been adequate
to protect the Council and the United Kingdom from irresponsible
actions by a non-member state, even if insufficient to Insure satis-
faction.
Cf great interest among the several interpretations o^ the
United Nations Charter which stem from the Corfu Channel Case is the
distinction apparent between the obligatory nature of a Security Coun-
cil decision under the provisions of Article 25 and the non-obligatory
nature of a recommendation. There is nothing in the Charter that
makes a Security Countil recommendation binding upon members, but un-
der Article 25 members have bound themselves to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council. Additional interest in the effect of the
Corfu Channel Case upon this point comes ^rom the fact that a quasi
-
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legal decision was taken on it in the Joint Separate opinions. The
United Kingdom argument that in this case a recommendation of the
Security Council bound Albania to accept the jurisdiction of the Court,
impelled seven judges of the Court to write a separate opinion to the
effect that the United Kingdom argument had not convinced them. This
88. For support of this view, see Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro,
Charter of the United Nations. Commentary and Documents (2nd ed»),
Boston, 1949, pp. 208-209; and "Charter of the United Nations," Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations 79th Congress, 1st Session,
Revised Edition, p. 81, quoted in John M. Jones, "Corfu Channel Case-
Jurisdiction," Orotius Society, Problems of Public and Private Inter-




was not a judgment for the Court Itself did not rule upon this ques-
tion, basing its decision on other arguments. It must, however, he
given weight in the interpretation of Article 25 and its influence
there is to restrict the binding actions of the Security Council to
"decisions.
3. Jurisdiction of the Court
The question of jurisdiction became complicated not because
Albania was not a party to the Statute of the Court nor a member of
the United Nations, but because there was no formal instrument, such
as the special agreement or written application referred to in Article
40 of the Statute, which related to Albania's participation in the
Court proceedings. Since the proceedings of an international court
of law have no coercive force, their eventual effectiveness is depen-
dent upon the acceptance by the sovereign states oarty to the dispute
of the competence of the court to deal with the matter, and, eventually,
the finding which the Court makes. It therefore appears extremely
important that this question of the willingness of the parties to
submit the dispute to a legal settlement be clearly established before
the Court proceeds. Some requirement for the execution of a formal
legal instrument for this purpose assumes a real virtue therefore.
The nature of international law seems to preclude a court assuming
a jurisdiction established in the »&*nner of the Corfu Channel Case,
However, the United Nations Charter requires that members comply with
the deciiiions of the Court, so that If a formal finding that jurisdic-
tion has been established is handed down, members of the United Nations
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and states who have accepted the obligations of members must accept
this jurisdiction in tho particular case being dealt with by the Court.
There is, therefore, no question of the obligation of Albania to comply
with the ttecision of the Court, in spite of the fact that the argument
against the Court's jurisdiction made in support of the preliminary
objection seems well foundea. The fact that it was necessary for
the Court to go somewhat beyond established law to thus assert its
jurisdiction, and that it did so, again lends coloration to its pro-
ceedings that cannot avoid consideration by states parties to dis-
putes. Ibis is the fact that led to Jones 1 comment in his article,
"It can be soundly inferred that if in th& future a State desires to
object to the jurisdiction, it should do so at the first possible
89
opportunity and in clear and unmistakable language."
It is pousible to extend the conclusions from a single case
too far. It would require a great deal of additional support to
demonstrate a general moral effect resulting from a Security Council
Resolution. The actions of Albania coula be used in partial demon-
stration of such an argument, for Albania at no time subsequent to
the recommendation specifically disputed tne jurisdiction of the Court,
but only the manner in which it had been established. There is tne
implication in her proceedings that sne will eventually appear before
the Court on the merits of the case. Her reactions to the Security
Council decision on her membership make an evaluation of the influence
upon Albania of the Security Council resolution very difficult.
89. Jones, pp. clt .. pp. 91-111.
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4» The Special Agreement
The usefulness o** the compromis or special agreement In pro-
ceedings before an international tribunal is clearly demonstrated in
this case. It enables the Court to deal with the points at issue
upon which the parties hare agreed to accept the Court's decision.
It protects both the parties and the Court from disagreeable sur-
prises. In this case it seems to have represented the high-water
mark of agreement.
The seemingly insignificant omission from the agreement of
the question of the amount of compensation to be paid the United King-
dom in case of a finding in its favor became a major problem and it
was necessary in this case, as it had been in the problem of juris-
diction, for the Court to make a broad assumption of power in a sep-
arate judgment. It is not clear from the Court documents whether the
insertion of a clause in the Special Agreement to specifically provide
for this decision was considered in the drafting of the Special Agree-
ment. There is no remedy for Albania from the Court's finding, how-
ever, that such a clause was unnecessary.
5. Bvalttatlon of Evidence
In both the Security Council's considerations and the hearings
of the International Court, it was necessary ^or evidence to be evalua-
ted. The evidence introduced to the Security Council was entirely
that brought forward by the United Kingdom in support o^ its case.
The Security Council relied upon a subcommittee to examine this evi-
dence and report, and the subcommittee availed itself o*" experts. It
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It doubtful if such evidence could nave much more weight in influenc-
ing decisions of the Council than the simple statement o*" its content
by the state presenting it. It is a fact that the expressions and
votes of the members of the Sedurity Council will represent their
national policies and not a verdict as to what has or has not been
proved in evidence.
The International Court, on the other hand, has theoretically
eschewed any considerations of national interest and is in a position
to make an impartial evaluation of evidence. The difficulty here is
that the consideration of evidence by an international tribunal auto-
matically gives the advantage to the more powerful state which can
bring more resources into play in building its case. It is for this
reason that the International Court should restrict itself to the
application o^ law to predetermined facts which should be matters of
agreement between the parties.
6. Bffect of Hon-compliance
A question that may be asked is whether Albania's refusal to
execute the judgment of the Court and pay compensation, has not lowered
the standing of the Court. In one sense it must, but the effective-
ness of the Court's action is nonetheless great. The legal points
established in its findings are not affected by the non-compliance of
a party. There is no question in world opinion but that the Court
found the Albanian government responsible for the loss of life and
property sustained by the United Kingdom, and the refusal of Albania
to pay the sum of money assessed as compensation is an insignificant
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factor in relationship to an international decision accomplished on
the dispute. fttrthermore, the United Kingdom still has a remedy un-
der Article 94 of the Charter.
7. The Maintenance of International Peace and Security
It will not be asserted that the handling of this case by the
organs of the United Nations prevented a breakdown of international
peace and security. The days of punitive expeditions and reprisals
by European nations are over. It can be said that the existence
of the United Nations provides an outlet for the expression of national
indignation which, in other times, has been constrained to hostili-
ties for lack of another means of expression. The needs o*" a
sovereign nation to react in the international field are provided *or
in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Generally speak-
ing, military measures are distasteful to governments because they are
final and irreversible processes and are undertaken only as a last
resort, frequently in satisfaction of popular national feeling. Some
satisfaction o? such sentiment can be provided by the public exposi-
tion of a nation's case before an international body. In taking
note of this capacity of the United Nations organs to provide outlets
for national impulses it must be observed that aside from the Security
Council's recommendation that the United Kingdom and Albanian govern-
ments should immediately refer the dispute to the Court, the United






the Court under Article 40 of the Statute. The competence of the
Court would, as a separate matter, have had to be established.
One of the features of greatest interest in the overall view
is the participation of a non-member in the activities of the Security
Council and International Court and the accompanying acceptance of
the responsibilities of a member.
As for the Security Council itself, perhaps the greatest
contribution of the Corfu Channel Case to its practice in the mainten-
ance of peace and security, was the affirmation of freedom of action
under the Charter accompanied by the restrictive interpretation of
Article 25. The problems of the Security Council in dealing with
disputes become primarily those of selection of which cases should be
dealt with and can be effectively dealt with. It should come as no
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